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 We believe that the protection of civilians under 
Chapter VII is a pertinent development in the con-
text of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. 
This draft resolution is significant in that it intro-
duces a new, fundamental political, legal and moral 
dimension. This bears on the credibility of the Secu-
rity Council and shows that the Council has learned 
from its own experience and that it will not remain 
indifferent to indiscriminate attacks against the ci-
vilian population.2 
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UN-
MISS) was established on 8 July 2011 by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1996 under a Chapter VII man-
date to assist the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan (GoRSS) ‘to consolidate peace and security’ and 
to extend and strengthen state authority. In line with 
its mandate, UNMISS is a decentralized mission with 
most of its staff planned to be deployed at state and 
county levels.  
OCHA–DPKO Report on PoC
In the wake of these same events, the international 
community began to discuss protection as the respon-
sibility of sovereign states – and, more importantly, to 
question the concept of sovereign inviolability when 
states failed to do so. In 2005 the unanimously adopt-
ed World Summit Outcome document affirmed that 
states have responsibility to protect the populations 
within their territories, and that the ‘international 
community’ – through UN Security Council authori-
zation – is ‘prepared to take collective action’– includ-
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC): 
Evolution of the Concept
PoC, or the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 
‘refers to the protection of civilians from widespread 
threats of violence, coercion, and the deliberate dep-
rivation of aid’. The concept is rooted in International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL, also known as the Law of 
Armed Conflict), a body of law which ‘calls on bellig-
erent actors to minimize harm to civilians and civil-
ian property in the conduct of hostilities ... It also calls 
for the protection of civilians from violence’.1 As such, 
PoC is a long-standing principle, a non-negotiable ob-
ligation that applies to all armed actors when engaged 
in armed conflict.
From its IHL origins, however, protection has taken 
on a new tone and a new kind of political relevance 
in the past 20 years. The horrific attacks on civilians 
in Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda were both 
witnessed by UN Peacekeeping contingents that had 
neither the mandate nor the capacity to put a halt to 
them. These experiences led the UN to question its 
responsibility, authority, and the limits of its capacity 
to protect civilians under threat. In 1999 the UNAM-
SIL mandate – authorizing the deployment of a peace-
keeping operation in Sierra Leone – became the first 
to incorporate language authorizing peacekeepers to 
use force in order to protect civilians under ‘imminent 
threat’ of violence. 
In a statement that captures the spirit of the PoC dis-
cussion at the time, the Argentinian representative on 
the UN Security Council stated:
1 Oxfam International Website, http://www.oxfam.org/en/cam-
paigns/conflict/protection-of-civilians
2 As quoted in V. Holt et al., Protecting Civilians in the Context of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining 
Challenges (New York: United Nations, 2009), p. 39. 
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ing militarily action – to protect civilians if the host 
state is ‘manifestly failing’ to do so.3  
In 2011 NATO forces mounted an intervention in Lib-
ya, to protect the civilian population from the violent 
threats of the government. The intervention was initi-
ated under the terms of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973 (2011). This was a landmark resolution: as 
the first to authorize military intervention without the 
consent of the host-state government, it pushed the 
boundaries of the most contentious aspect of the re-
sponsibility-to-protect (R2P) debate. In the aftermath, 
it also highlighted some important gaps in the practi-
cal capacity and preparation of the international com-
munity to mount responsible military interventions 
aimed at providing protection. 
In many ways, this experience brought PoC back full 
circle, restoring IHL to its position as the centre of 
gravity of the international protection debate. In Lib-
ya, 72 civilians4 were killed by NATO airstrikes that 
had been authorized in the name of R2P. This was a 
reminder to policy-makers and activists alike that the 
use of force always creates a risk for civilians, and it 
catalysed a discussion that reaffirmed the point that all 
military operations – however ‘just’ their cause – have 
an obligation to uphold IHL.5         
In the course of the past 20 years, the ‘protection’ dia-
logue has come to encompass issues of IHL observance, 
the role and responsibility of states, regional actors and 
multinational bodies, as well as the practical challenges 
of protection at the operational and tactical levels.
AU Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians
Many UN peacekeeping mandates have included ‘pro-
tection language’ since 1999, but implementation – 
in operational and tactical terms – continues to vary 
depending on the interpretation of individual com-
manders. At the field level, UN peace operations have 
increasingly been required to produce mission-wide 
PoC strategies to reduce this confusion, and in 2010 
the DPKO–DFS Operational Concept for the Protection 
of Civilians in UN Peace Operations6 became the first 
concrete articulation of what ‘protection’ means for 
UN peacekeeping across the board. In 2011, the Under-
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping established a new 
set of training modules, based on the structure of the 
Operational Concept and designed to reach military, 
police and civilian staff at the operational (or manage-
ment) level.
The African Union (AU) has taken steps that mir-
ror and, in some cases, anticipate UN develop-
ments with regard to the protection of civilians. 
In practical terms, there has been a particular fo-
cus on the military, ‘physical’ aspect of protection:
 Recognizing the distinct threats faced by civilian 
populations in conflict zones in Africa, and the cen-
tral role of AU-mandated peace support operations 
in contributing to the protection of civilian popula-
tions in conflict zones, as well as the importance of 
effective protection with regards to the effective con-
duct and legitimacy of peace support operations, the 
Commission (on the Development of Guidelines 
for the Protection of Civilians in African Peace sup-
port Operations) has, since 2009, prioritized the 
development of a protection of civilians approach 
for AU-mandated peace support operations.7
In 2009, work began on developing a framework for a 
consolidated protection response.8 The result is been 
the Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in AU 
Peace Support Operations. 
The Draft Guidelines are organized into four ‘tiers’ or 
dimensions of protection: protection through political 
process;9 physical protection; rights-based protection; 
and establishing a secure environment. These ‘tiers’ 
are similar to the UN’s Operational Concept (which em-
phasizes protection through political processes, protec-
tion from physical violence, and the establishment of 
a secure environment), but with one important differ-
ence. In the UN Operational Concept, the ‘tiers’ are de-
scribed as outcomes rather than approaches, and each 
tier includes civilian, police and military dimensions. 
In contrast, the AU concept – as well as the practical 
approach taken by the AU in Somalia and in Sudan – 
separates political, human rights and stabilization ap-
proaches from physical protection. As explained by Appi-
ah-Mensah and Eklou-Assogbavi, ‘while responsibilities 
in UN peacekeeping operations for the protection of ci-
vilians rest with the military, police and civilian compo-
nents, these responsibilities are predominantly a military 
undertaking in AU peace support operations. This is be-
cause the AU civilian capacity in the field is embryonic.’10 
As the AU develops its capacity, an increase in non-mili-
7   African Union, Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commis-
sion on the Development of Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians 
in African Union Peace Support Operations (PSC/PR/2 - CCLXX-
IX) (May 2011), Para. 5. Available at: http://www.peaceau.org/
uploads/progress-report-protection-of-civilians-eng-.pdf
8   P.D. Williams, ‘The African Union Mission in Somalia and Ci-
vilian Protection Challenges’, Stability: International Journal of 
Security and Development, Vol.2, forthcoming 2013, p. 3.
9   For example, ceasefire agreements, negotiated settlements, etc. 
10 S. Appiah-Mensah and R. Eklou-Assogbavi, ‘The Protection of 
Civilians: A Comparison Between United Nations and African 
Union Peace Operations’, Conflict Trends, No. 2 (South Africa: 
ACCORD, 2012).
3 United Nations, World Summit Outcomes Document (A/RES/ 
60/1), 2005, Para. 139. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/
adviser/pdf/World%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.
pdf#page=30
4 Human Rights Watch, ‘Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian 
Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya’, (May 2012) p. 4. 
Available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lib-
ya0512webwcover_0.pdf
5 ‘The essence of RWP (Responsibility While Protecting) was that 
military force must be a last resort, that any response must be 
proportional to the threat posed and that no R2P intervention 
should cause more harm than it seeks to prevent.’ In Simon Ad-
ams, Emergent Powers: India, Brazil, South Africa and the Respon-
sibility to Protect (GCR2P: New York, 14 September 2012), p. 4. 
(http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/adams-r2p-ibsa-1.pdf)
6 United Nations, ‘DPKO–DFS Operational Concept for the Pro-
tection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations’ (New York, 2010).
3tary protection inputs can be expected; but at present, the 
word ‘protection’ should be understood as encompassing 
primarily the military dimension of the concept.
AU Policy Documents and Statements
Beyond the Draft Guidelines, other AU statements and 
documents have highlighted a growing AU commit-
ment to PoC, albeit in an inconsistent way. The AMI-
SOM experience is a good illustration of this. As Wil-
liams has argued, AU and AMISOM ‘senior leadership 
have been at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory 
in their formulation of relevant documents and concepts 
for the mission’, sending mixed signals with regard to 
the nature of the AU’s commitment to protection, and 
what the organization expects of AMISOM soldiers.11  
– In 2010 the AU Peace and Security Council made a 
commitment to adherence to IHL in all peace opera-
tions, and the 2011 AMISOM Mission Implementation 
Plan mentioned PoC in terms of a commitment to 
adhere to and implement IHL.12 
– AMISOM’s 2007 and 2010 iterations of Rules of 
Engagement (ROEs) included ‘imminent threat’13  
language, and the Pocket Card explaining the AM-
ISOM ROEs specified that soldiers were ‘author-
ized to use force, up to and including deadly force … 
To protect civilians, including humanitarian work-
ers, under imminent threat of physical violence.’14  
This formulation parallels the language used in 
UN Chapter VII PoC mandates, and indicates a far 
more a proactive protection stance. 
– Finally, almost from the outset, AMISOM forces 
became ‘entangled in the fighting’ in Somalia and 
have taken a clear offensive ‘peace enforcement’ 
posture for the most of the mission’s engagement 
in Somalia.15  This illustrates the view of protection 
as a by-product of stabilization, of winning the war 
and establishing a ‘stable’, ‘peaceful’ environment. 
These are three very different approaches to ‘protec-
tion’ underpinned by different assumptions and legal 
frameworks, and requiring very different capabilities, 
resources and preparations.16 
Types of Protection
The AU rhetoric conflates IHL observance with proac-
tive protection. This is problematic in that it confuses 
IHL obligations17 with the specific, additional authorities 
conferred by UN Security Council protection mandates.18 
AMISOM was understood to be a peace enforcement 
mission – and thus a party to the conflict – almost 
from the very start.19 However, the mission was not 
equipped with capacity to monitor and investigate 
harm caused to civilians or civilian property, and guid-
ance regarding the use of indirect fire weapons was 
late in coming and failed to evolve with the tempo and 
combat capabilities of the mission. 
Within Mogadishu, the Somalian capital, combat be-
tween AMISOM and rebel groups often took place in 
densely populated neighbourhoods, resulting in con-
siderable20 civilian casualties. IHL does not prohibit 
combat in urban areas, but it does place greater obli-
gations on combatants, who are required to take steps 
to minimize the harm caused to civilians residing in 
these areas. ‘Weapons, such as heavy artillery with a 
large blast radius, may be considered indiscriminate 
when used in populated areas.’21  
AMISOM developed an indirect fire policy designed to 
constrain the use of indirect fire weapons with a view to 
reducing the harm to civilians. However, the policy was 
not implemented until 2011 and not incorporated into 
the revised Rules of Engagement until a full year later.22 
Furthermore, the implementation of the IFP did not 
result in the provision of ‘additional resources for train-
ing, mentoring and equipping.’ In other words, the ex-
pectations increased, but not the necessary support to 
help AMISOM solders meet those expectations.23 Fur-
thermore, policy was not modified to reflect the absorp-
tion of elements of the Kenyan Defence Forces and the 
new aerial bombardment capabilities associated with 
their contribution.
 
Similarly, the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and 
Response Cell (CCTARC) was designed in order to im-
prove AMISOM’s ability to track and investigate harm to 
civilians in a responsible way. After an extensive devel-
opment process and the declared support of AMISOM 
leadership, however, donor funding for the implemen-
tation of the CCTARC was withdrawn.,Recently several 
11 Williams, p. 2. 
12 Ibid. p. 3. 
13 Ibid, pp. 2–3. 
14 As quoted in Williams, p. 3.
15 W. Lotze and Y. Kasumba, ‘AMISOM and the Protection of 
Civilians in Somalia’, Conflict Trends, No. 2 (South Africa: AC-
CORD, 2012), p. 19. 
16 It should also be noted that AMISOM was deployed in 2007, 
but the protection debate did not get underway in the AU until 
2009. The institutional debate has shifted considerably from the 
first deployment of AMISOM forces, to the present day, and the 
term ‘protection’ has taken on varying institutional connotations 
as the discussion and context have evolved.
17 International Humanitarian Law – the law of armed conflict – is 
not a voluntary standard, but a non-negotiable minimum obliga-
tion for any and all parties to armed conflict. Customary IHL is 
binding on state and non-state actors alike.
18 As noted by the ICRC, ‘The application of IHL is not depend-
ent on a declaration or formal recognition of war. As the law in 
effect during armed conflict (known in Latin as the jus in bello), 
IHL is distinct from the legal regime enshrined in Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter governing the resort to force (known in Latin 
as the jus ad bellum). The distinction is important. That is be-
cause compliance with IHL may be significantly diminished if 
parties complied with it only when they deemed that the other 
party’s resort to war was lawful.’ (http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/in-
dex.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=2083) 
19 This is an approach very different from the UN operations which 
– as in North Kivu– tend not to take offensive action against rebel 
or other armed forces except in the direct defence of civilians 
under ‘imminent threat.’
20 CIVIC, ‘Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Re-
sponse’, (2011).
21 Human Rights Watch Website, http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/08/23/somalia-protect-civilians-kismayo.
22 Lotze and Kasumba, p. 23. 
23 Ibid.
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donors have expressed intest in fuding the mechanism, 
and the CCTARC plan is in the process of being formal-
ly adopted by the AU at the time of writing.  However, 
unreliable funding streams and shifts in donor interest 
and attaention have seriously delayed the implementa-
tion of this important mecghanism, and seriously un-
dermined AMISOM’s capacity to fulfil IHL obligations. 
The gaps and challenges confronting today’s multidi-
mensional peace operations – UN, AU or otherwise – 
go far beyond the ‘protection’ debate as such.24 Howev-
er, the protection of civilians is a singularly critical and 
challenging objective, and is central to the purpose and 
legitimacy of AU peace operations. The AMISOM ex-
perience has highlighted three clear gaps that demand 
urgent attention: 
1) IHL must be re-affirmed as the non-negotiable bed-
rock of all AU peace operations, and the foundation 
of the AU PoC debate.
2) In addition to fulfilling basic obligations under IHL, 
the AU needs to finalize the Draft Guidelines, and en-
sure that institutional expectations to AU troops are 
articulated clearly and consistently with regard to the 
proactive protection of civilians.
3) AU commanders and troops should be better trained 
and equipped, to ensure that they have the appropri-
ate capabilities and support to uphold their IHL obli-
gations and – where the mandate calls for it – to take 
more proactive steps to protect.
The Way Forward 
The PoC discussion within the AU – as everywhere else 
– has been somewhat disjointed and unclear. The word 
‘protection’ has been used to refer to IHL observance 
and ‘force protection’ as well as to proactive protective 
activities. AMISOM ‘protection’ activities exhibited a 
similarly disjointed approach to the concept. The AU 
needs to proceed step by step, and continue to benefit 
from the lessons that protection failures and successes 
have afforded the UN. 
First, IHL must be the firm base that all protection ac-
tivities – and, indeed, all use of force – are built upon. 
IHL must be entrenched in all AU peace-operation poli-
cies, mission plans and training initiatives. 
Secondly, the AMISOM experience – and over a decade 
of UN peacekeeping experience – has shown the im-
portance of clear, consistent articulation of institutional 
expectations with regard to the proactive protection of 
civilians. MOUs, ROEs, FC directives and all other di-
rections and explanations provided to AU commanders 
and their troops must give a clear picture of the author-
ity and obligations that AU troops are expected to ob-
serve with regard to the complex and often politically 
difficult objective of the protection of civilians. 
Finally, protection efforts – for basic IHL observance and 
more forward-leaning protection efforts – are technical-
ly demanding, resource-intensive endeavours. ‘Getting 
it right’ requires the right tools and capabilities, as well 
as political support. Concrete policies and guidance – 
such as the indirect fire policy and CCTARC capacities 
– must be developed and deployed as a routine part of 
all peace operations. 
While the international community has made consider-
able contributions – financial, technical and material – 
to AU operations, these contributions have often been 
slow to arrive and have proven unpredictable over time. 
Long-term planning has been difficult, exposing civil-
ians and AU troops to extremely high levels of risk. 
International donors, in coordination with the UN, 
must establish a reliable, predictable funding mecha-
nism that can ensure that AU peace operations have the 
appropriate tools to conduct the increasingly dangerous 
work with which they have been tasked.
 
24 See, for example, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New 
Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (http://www.un.org/en/peace-
keeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf)
